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STATE COURT PATENT CASES
I. Introduction
Most attorneys, even those who do not practice patent law, are
aware that patent matters are uniquely federal matters. An
attorney who does not practice patent law may know that the
Patent and Trademark Office is a federal office, or that the
Constitution refers to patents.1 On the other hand, an attorney
who practices patent law would probably know that, by statute,
patent jurisdiction is exclusive to the federal courts.2 Both types
of attorneys would probably share the belief that all patent
controversies are heard in federal courts.
This is not the case. As patent jurisdiction currently stands, a
plaintiff must carefully word the complaint to have the case heard
in federal court. Moreover, some cases cannot be heard in federal
court, regardless of how the complaint is worded.3 The patent
cases currently heard in state courts are those which in some
manner involve a patent license or assignment dispute. Although
the number of cases heard in federal courts dwarfs the number
heard in state courts, the state court jurisdictional anomaly has
created significant problems. State courts ignore relevant facts,
misinterpret federal patent law and render wrong decisions. State
courts also lack the resources to properly adjudicate the patent
cases they must now decide.
This article presents a background of federal patent jurisdiction
as it currently stands, sets forth the problems with federal patent
jurisdiction and suggests that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (hereinafter "Federal Circuit") should reverse previous
decisions and hold that all cases involving a patent matter must be
heard in federal court. The article further demonstrates that a
ruling of this type by the Federal Circuit is fully consistent with
both the Constitution and laws of the United States.
1. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution states "The Congress shall have the
Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 8.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993).
3. This comment addresses federal question jurisdiction. Of course, if diversity of
citizenship exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), a federal court can hear a patent case




The statute which sets forth federal patent jurisdiction states,
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant
variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety
protection and copyright cases."' Although the patent jurisdiction
statute mandates that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, the
judicial interpretation of the patent jurisdiction statute has focused
on interpreting the words "arising under." The words "arising
under" also appear in the Constitution and the general federal
question jurisdiction statute, and the interpretation of "arising
under" in the patent jurisdiction statute is closely related to the
interpretation of these words as they appear both in the
Constitution and the general federal jurisdiction statute. Therefore,
any examination of federal patent jurisdiction must also include a
consideration of both federal jurisdiction under the Constitution
and the general federal jurisdiction statute.
A. Federal Jurisdiction Under the Constitution
The words "arising under" first described federal jurisdiction
in 1789 when Article II of the Constitution set forth that "the
judicial power of the United States shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority. 5  In the 1824 case of Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,6 the Supreme Court interpreted this sentence of Article II.
The Osborn Court faced the question of the extent of Congress'
power to create federal jurisdiction.7
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
7. Id. Prior to this case, the Court held in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), that it was constitutional for Congress to create the Bank of the United States
and that states were not allowed to tax the bank. Undaunted, several states, including Ohio,
continued taxing. Ohio state officers raided $120,000 from the Bank of the United States
and Federal Officers retaliated by taking $98,000 from the Ohio state treasury. Osborn, 22
U.S. at 742. Osborn arose when the bank sued the state treasurer in federal court to recover
the remaining $22,000. Id. at 743-44. Federal jurisdiction was provided by a statute stating
that the Bank of the United states is able to "sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded ...
in any Circuit court of the United States," and the issue was whether Congress was
[Vol. 101:1
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In deciding the issue, the Court explained that federal judicial
power must be co-extensive with federal legislative power and that
Congress must be able to enforce every federal statute.8 The
Court went on to explain that a case "arises under" federal law
when federal law "forms an ingredient of the original cause ...
[even though] other questions of fact or law may be involved in
it."9 Explaining, the Court stated that there is federal jurisdiction
when, "the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by
one construction of the constitution or law of the United States,
and sustained by the opposite construction."'"
This test is known as the "original ingredient test." It allows
Congress to create federal court jurisdiction whenever federal law
forms a potential ingredient in the case. The federal judicial power
extends to cases which might turn on federal law, no matter how
unlikely it is that federal law would be a basis for the decision.
B. The General Federal Jurisdiction Statute
In 1875 Congress passed the first law giving federal courts
general jurisdiction over federal matters.1 In its current form, the
law reads, "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States.' 12 The 1908 Supreme Court decision of Louisville
& Nashville Railroad v. Mottley" is closely associated with the
interpretation of the jurisdictional statute. The interpretation can
be summarized by the following principle: a case arises under
constitutionally allowed to create federal jurisdiction via the statute. Id. at 818.
8. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 818-19.
9. Id. at 823.
10. Id. at 822.
11. Prior to general federal question jurisdiction, federal courts heard cases under
statutes such as the one in Osborn, see supra note 7, providing jurisdiction for specific federal
causes of action. The Midnight Judges Act briefly created federal question jurisdiction in
1801. Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act. of Mar. 8, 1801, ch. 8, § 1, 2
Stat. 132. The Midnight Judges Act is famous for creating the controversy resolved in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993).
13. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). In this case, the Mottleys were injured in a railroad accident
and were promised free railroad passes for the rest of their lives. Id. at 150. In 1907
Congress passed a federal law making free railroad passes illegal. Id. at 151. The Mottleys
sued in federal court for breach of contract, arguing that application of the law would be an
unconstitutional taking of their property. Id. at 150. The Supreme Court held that federal
issues arose only as an anticipated defense, i.e., the statute made the contract illegal, and
therefore federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
1996]
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federal law if it is apparent from the face of the plaintiff's com-
plaint that the cause of action was created by federal law.14 In
other words, federal courts have jurisdiction if the construction or
effect of the Constitution or federal statute will necessarily form an
essential part of the litigation. If a plaintiff wants his case to be
heard in federal court, he must raise federal issues in the complaint.
This rule has been termed "the well-pleaded complaint rule" or the
"Mottley rule."
If a federal matter is not raised in the complaint but will
necessarily form an essential part of litigation, federal jurisdiction
exists. 5 Conversely, if a federal matter will likely form an
essential part of the litigation when the federal matter is asserted
as a defense, federal jurisdiction does not exist. In this situation,
federal jurisdiction does not exist because of the possibility that the
defendant will not raise the defense.
C. The Patent Jurisdiction Statute
Although patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) is
exclusive to federal courts and general federal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 is not, the test to determine whether a federal court
will hear patent matters is substantially the same as the test to
determine whether a federal court will hear general federal matters.
The similarity of the tests is understandable for a number of
reasons. As mentioned above,16 both the patent jurisdiction
statute and the general federal jurisdiction statute contain the
"arising under" language. When the federal courts first interpreted
the patent jurisdiction statute, 7 decisions about whether jurisdic-
tion existed were easy. In Wilson v. Sanford,8 the Supreme Court
could not hear the case, regardless of whether federal jurisdiction
was proper, because the Supreme Court only had appellate
jurisdiction over lower federal court decisions if the amount in
controversy exceeded $2,000, and Wilson involved less than
14. See E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION 230-40 (1989).
15. If a case is brought in state court which necessarily involves federal issues that are
not raised in the complaint, the defendant is given the power to remove to federal court. See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
16. See discussion supra part II.
17. Federal patent jurisdiction predates general federal jurisdiction as it traces back to
§ 17 of the Patent Act of 1836 while general federal jurisdiction only traces back to 1875.
18. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850).
[Vol. 101:1
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$2,000.19 Hartell v. Tilghman20 is another example of an easy
decision. Hartel was a license dispute in which the validity of the
patent was conceded. 21 In a series of later opinions22 ending with
Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,23 the Court was faced with more difficult
cases. However, the 1908 Motley decision preceded these later
decisions. Therefore, general federal jurisdiction and the statutory
definition of "arising under" were already well established. 4
In Luckett, the Supreme Court stated "jurisdiction must
depend on the remedy [the plaintiff] chose and sought in its
bill."'  For example, a suit of patent infringement has been found
to warrant a federal remedy, 6 presumably because the patent
statute provides for such a remedy.2 7 However, a suit for damages
on a patent license or patent assignment is not considered to be a
federal remedy.2 Therefore, the complaint must clearly specify
that a remedy is being sought for patent infringement.
In a suit for damages on a license or assignment of a patent,
a valid defense would be to assert that the patent is invalid.29
However, one could not have a federal court decide the legitimacy
of the would-be invalidity defense by bringing a suit under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.3" The Declaratory Judgment Act has
19. Id. at 102.
20. 99 U.S. 547 (1878).
21. Id. at 550.
22. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 24 U.S. 1 (1912); The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22
(1913); American Well Works v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916); Luckett v.
Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
23. 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
24. The constitutional definition of "arising under" is different than the statutory
definition of "arising under." See discussion supra part II A-B.
25. Luckett, 270 U.S. at 507 (citing Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917)).
26. See, e.g., Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915); Henry, 224 U.S. 1.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 281.
28. Wilson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 99 (involving patent license dispute); Luckett, 270 U.S.
496 (involving patent assignment dispute).
29. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1993). The Declaratory Judgment Act provides in part, "In a case
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the
filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought." Id. Suits brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act present a peculiar problem
to a federal court in that the federal court must look into the mind of the Declaratory
Judgment plaintiff to determine whether the underlying case is one of patent infringement
or a suit for damages under a license or an assignment. For example, some decisions find
an absence of Declaratory Judgment jurisdiction unless the license agreement has been
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been held not to expand subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts.3 This applies equally as well to the general federal
jurisdiction statute.32
III. The Problems with Patent Jurisdiction as Currently Applied
While it is understandable that the patent jurisdiction statute
and the general jurisdiction statute generally have the same
interpretation because both statutes contain the words "arising
under," whether this interpretation is appropriate for the patent
jurisdiction statute is an issue that merits examination.
A. The Cases Now Heard in State Court Present Complex Patent
Issues
As background for understanding the patent cases now heard
in state court, one should realize that when a patentee enters into
a patent licensing contract, the patentee is promising not to sue the
licensee. In return, the licensee promises to make royalty payments
or to provide the patentee with other consideration. When the
licensee fails to make royalty payments, the patentee can either sue
for infringement, a federal cause of action, or for non-payment of
royalties, usually a state contract cause of action.33 As one would
expect, the issues that arise in the state case may be very similar- to
the issues that arise in the federal case.
In a state case for non-payment of royalties, the license in
dispute may have royalties calculated on a per-item basis. In other
words, the patentee may be paid a set fee for every item made,
used or sold according to the subject matter of the patent.34 If the
licensee can prove that its items are not made according to the
subject matter of the patent, it will not be liable for royalties
calculated on a per-item basis. By properly asserting this defense,
a licensee can force a state court to decide whether its actions
constitute infringement.
A licensee was not traditionally permitted to assert that the
subject matter of the license was invalid, the basis for which is the
terminated, reasoning that until such termination, there can be no threatened action for
infringement. See D. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 22.02[1][b] (1995).
31. Cincinnati Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Vigorith, 212 F.2d 583, (6th Cir. 1954).
32. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
33. See Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
34. A U.S. patent gives one the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
patented invention in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1993).
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common law rule of "licensee estoppel." However, in the 1969
case of Lear, Inc v. Adkins,35 when Adkins sued for non-payment
of royalties under his gyroscope patent, Lear asserted that the
Adkins patent was invalid as being anticipated by prior art.
3 6
When the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court on a related
matter, the Court held that the common law principle of "licensee
estoppel" does not apply in patent cases, and the defense of
invalidity is available to a licensee.37 As a result of the Lear
decision, state courts may be forced to rule on the validity of a
federal patent, a result that could not have been envisioned when
the patent jurisdiction statute was being interpreted in the Luckett
decision.
The issues that arise in deciding infringement and validity are
very complex. For example, the meaning and scope of the claims
of the subject patent must be interpreted according to a complex
and always changing legal process. For example, under a legal
theory known as the doctrine of equivalents, "if two devices do the
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish the same
result, they are the same, even though they may differ in name,
form or shape."38 Therefore, a court may have to resolve engi-
neering issues such as what other devices or processes are structur-
ally and functionally equivalent to that claiming infringement.
39
As evidence of the complexity, in order for an attorney to procure
patents and practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
he or she must have technical training such as a four year engineer-
ing degree and also pass a patent law bar exam separate from the
state bar exam.4 Patent practice is one of the only areas of law
requiring a separate certification to ensure that practitioners are
qualified."
Because of the complexity of patent infringement and validity
issues, license disputes should be heard by judges who are at least
somewhat familiar with patent law. This principle was recognized
in 1982 when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
35. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
36. Id. at 670. For a more detailed discussion of Lear, see infra part IV.B.
37. Id.
38. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
39. Id. at 608.
40. 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(b) (1995).




created to have patent issues heard by judges who are more
familiar with patent law and to promote uniformity in patent
decisions.42 However, because there are many state courts and
few state patent cases,43 it is not possible for state judges to be as
familiar with patent issues. Moreover, for a federal court to hear
a patent case successfully brought in state court, the case would
have to reach the state supreme court, and the United States
Supreme Court would have to grant certiorari.
B. Patent Jurisdiction as Currently Applied Allows Manipulation
of the Case Outcome
In addition to the complexity problem, because the choice
exists whether to sue in federal court for patent infringement or sue
in state court for non-payment of royalties, it is possible to
manipulate jurisdiction. In fact, in their article The Road Less
Travelled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark or Copy-
right Disputes, Ted Lee and Ann Livingston set forth specific
guidelines for manipulating jurisdiction to have patent issues
resolved in state courts.44. For example, Lee and Livingston
describe how a plaintiff should phrase the statement of the case to
avoid removal and preemption. 5
Manipulating which court hears a case is not inherently bad.
However, when manipulation of which court hears the case allows
the manipulation of the decision, then justice is not served. State
judges, because of their unfamiliarity with patent issues, may be
reluctant to hold that a patent is invalid. In a recent case, a state
judge stated "[c]onstruing patent claims is a somewhat novel
experience for this court. ,,46 State judges may therefore give
unwarranted weight to a presumption that issued patents are
valid.47 For a plaintiff who is unsure of the validity of his patent,
42. H.R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1981).
43. From 1984 to 1994 there were approximately only forty cases heard by state courts.
This number is based on the number of state cases published in the United States Patent
Quarterly, a specialized patent law case digest, and based on the number of state cases
having patent issues according to the West Keynote subject index.
44. Ted D. Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road Less Travelled: State Court Resolution of
Patent, Trademark or Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 703 (1988).
45. Id. at 705-13.
46. MGA, Inc. v. LaSalle Machine Tool, Inc., 384 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986).
47. See MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947). The first
sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 282 reads "A patent shall be presumed valid."
[Vol. 101:1
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a state court may be a better forum.4" Indeed, Lee and Livingston
in their article advocating state resolution of patent issues argue,
"[s]tate court litigation has a higher success rate-plaintiffs prevail
more frequently in state court than in Federal Court."49 More-
over, because the case is brought as a license/assignment dispute,
a federal court would likely not interfere and decide the validity of
the patent under the Declaratory Judgment Act.5" Empowering
state courts to hear patent disputes, allows the plaintiff to manipu-
late the decision by choice of forum. Thus, patent jurisdiction as
it currently operates is unjust.
C. State Courts Are Incapable of Properly Adjudicating the
Patent Cases They Must Now Hear
Because relatively few patent cases are heard in state courts,51
state judges are inexperienced in hearing the issues presented
therein. In Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland,52 the
court stated, "Patent cases are, to say the least, rare in the
[Pennsylvania] Court of Common Pleas. Complicated facts and law
completely beyond the experience of the court have been litigat-
ed."53 As might be expected, decisions on patent cases handled
by state judges are often technically inaccurate, and sometimes the
decisions are simply wrong. While every court from time to time
makes a wrong' decision, the state court errors discussed below are
blatant, and could easily have been avoided if the cases had been
adjudicated by more experienced courts.
For example, in Aetna-Standard, an invention was made while
Remmer and Rowland were employed with Aetna-Standard. 4 A
patent application naming both Remmer and Rowland as inventors
was filed on the invention, and the application issued as U.S. Patent
48. In Creative Mfg., Inc. v. Unik, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), the patent
holder, under the advice of his patent attorneys, brought the case in state court. The
defendants quickly contested the validity of the patent. Id.
49. Lee & Livingston, supra note 44, at 704.
50. See supra note 30.
51. See supra note 43.
52. Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 223 U.S.P.Q. 557 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1983), rev'd,
493 A.2d 1375, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
53. Id. at 560.
54. In this case, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas heard "exceptions" to an
unpublished December 30, 1982 trial court order. Id. at 557.
1996]
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No. 4,037,453. Because of its shop right,55 Aetna-Standard was
allowed to make use of the entire claimed subject matter of the
invention. However, after Rowland was no longer an employee of
Aetna-Standard, Aetna-Standard sued Rowland in state court to
prevent Rowland from using the subject matter of the invention for
which Remmer was responsible. The court reasoned that for claims
6, 8 through 10 and 13 through 15 of the patent,56 Rowland was
the sole inventor.5 ' Relying on the facts that one patent applica-
tion may include more than one invention 58 and that inventorship
may be corrected,59 the court divided the patent on a per-claim
basis.'
However, contrary to the court's position in Aetna-Standard,
it is well established that when a patent is taken out in the joint
names of two or more persons, the parties are joint owners. 61  As
a result, the rights provided by the patent are indivisible.62 Had
Aetna-Standard been tried by a more competent court, this basic
tenant of patent law would have been recognized. The issue,
therefore, would have been summarily decided, and the court's
error would have been avoided.
55. If an employee invents on an employer's time and with the aid of the employer's
facilities, the employer has a non-exclusive license to practice the invention without payment
of royalties. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Lane & Bodley
Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886).
56. From the decision, it appears that the court was initially using the Abstract of the
Disclosure section of the patent to interpret the scope of the claims. Aetna-Standard, 223
U.S.P.Q. at 558.
57. Claim 6 was independent, with claims 7 through 10 depending thereon, and claim
13 was independent, with claims 14 through 16 depending thereon. Id. at 558.
58. 35 U.S.C § 121 (1994) provides in part, "If two or more independent and distinct
inventions are claimed in one application, the Commissioner may require the application to
be restricted to one of the inventions."
59. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994) provides in part, "The error of [misjoinder of joint inventors]
shall not invalidate [a] patent ... if such error can be corrected as provided in this section."
60. The decision was later reversed in Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 493 A.2d
1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
61. Duke v. Graham, 19 F. 647 (N.D. Miss. 1884).
62. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 803 (D. Del. 1954).
One owning a patent with several claims cannot assign a single claim. Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248 (1892).
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Heath v. Zenkich61 is another example of state courts being
unable to properly decide the patent cases that they must now hear.
The dispute in Heath was over inventorship of two patent applica-
tions.6' One patent application, filed on February 27, 1978, was
for a device, "the BI-PAK 2," which permits defibrillation of a
patient during physiological monitoring by using one pair of
electrodes for both defibrillation and physiological monitoring.65
The other patent application, filed on December 20, 1976, was for
a grounding pad, "the BI-PAD," used during electrosurgical
procedures. 66  Both inventions were made while Heath was
working with Zenkich's company, Zenex.67 After the patent
applications were filed, Heath learned that Zenkich was named as
the sole inventor in both applications. Heath brought suit to have
himself named as the sole inventor or, alternatively, as a joint
inventor.68
To support his position that he invented the BI-PAK 2 and the
BI-PAD, Heath described in detail the functions for both inven-
tions. 69 Heath also presented evidence demonstrating his involve-
ment with the two projects. For example, during trial Scott
Saulters, a co-worker of Heath, testified that Heath conceived the
BI-PAK 2 invention based on an idea Heath got from the televi-
sion show "Space 1999. "7 Saulters also identified drawings and
sketches of the BI-PAK 2 as belonging to Heath. An early sketch,
dated June 22, 1976, was initialed by Heath, and a more detailed
drawing was signed by Heath, witnessed by Saulters, and dated
October 8, 1976. 7'
Heath established that he built a prototype of the BI-PAK 2
and testified that he believed Zenkich was not aware that Heath
63. 540 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). Heath filed his case in the circuit court of Cook
County, Illinois, which dismissed the case. Heath appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court
found that the dismissal was improper and remanded the case. Heath v. Zenkich, 437 N.E.2d
675 (1982). The circuit court ruled for Zenkich and Heath appealed. Heath, 540 N.E.2d at
777-78.
64. Heath, 540 N.E.2d at 763.
65. Id. at 777.
66. Id.
67. In the case, Heath argued that he was an independent contractor, and Zenkich
argued that Heath was an employee. The court held that Heath was an employee. Id.
68. Id. at 778.





was building a prototype.7 2  Moreover, according to Dr. Alon
Winnie, chairman of the Department of Anesthesia at the Univer-
sity of Illinois, Heath had shown Dr. Winnie the prototype and
Zenkich had referred to the prototype as Heath's "toy."73 Specifi-
cally with regard to the BI-PAD, Heath presented publications he
wrote describing the BI-PAD, including one called "Electro-
surgically Speaking.
74
The court failed to recognize that a person's contribution to an
invention does not have to be very great for the person to qualify
as an inventor. As stated by the Sixth Circuit in General Motors
Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co.," "it is appropriate to define the
concept of joint invention broadly."76  In Monsanto Co. v.
Kamp,77 the court explained "[t]o constitute a joint invention, it
is necessary that each of the inventors work on the same subject
matter and make some contribution to the inventive thought and
to the final result. ... The fact that . .. the contribution of one
may not be as great as that of another, does not detract from the
fact that the invention is joint .... ,7 In fact, in DeLaski &
Thropp Circular Woven Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp & Sons.
Co,7 9 the court noted that one is a joint inventor "even though his
contribution be of comparatively minor importance and merely the
application of an old idea."8"
To counter the evidence presented by Heath and in an effort
to show that he was the inventor of the BI-PAK 2 and the BI-
PAD, Zenkich testified "it's a very simple product, nothing
electronic about it. There's no TV tubes or chips or anything.
81
72. Id. at 778-79.
73. Id. at 778.
74. "Electrosurgically Speaking" was a sales handout for the TERRAPAD, the former
name for the BI-PAD, dated Dec. 8, 1975. Heath, 540 N.E.2d at 778. As previously
mentioned, the patent application for the BI-PAD was not filed until Dec. 20, 1976. The
court did not recognize that any patent issuing from the BI-PAD application will likely be
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which provides in part that "A person shall be entitled to
a patent unless ... (b) the invention was ... described in a printed publication... or on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application." Heath, 540 N.E.2d
at 778.
75. 667 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 507.
77. 269 F. Supp. 818, (D.D.C. 1967).
78. Id. at 824.
79. 218 F. 458 (D.N.J. 1914), affd, 226 F. 941 (3d Cir. 1915).
80. Id. at 464.
81. Heath, 540 N.E.2d at 779.
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Presumably to address whether Heath built the first prototype of
the BI-PAK 2, Zenkich testified that the first BI-PAK 2 was
constructed in the early 1970s, before the Heath prototype.82 As
to physical evidence establishing that Zenkich was the inventor,
Zenkich testified that he had made sketches and drawings.
However, despite the litigation, Zenkich did not know if any of the
sketches and drawings had been kept.83 With regard to the BI-
PAD, Zenkich testified that he built a prototype in the "early 70s,
3, 4, 5. ,84 Later, Zenkich testified that he conceived the BI-PAD
as early as 1974-76.85 The court did not recognize this inconsis-
tency. Furthermore, Zenkich could not remember to whom he first
disclosed either the BI-PAK 2 or the BI-PAD.
8 6
Despite the extensive evidence demonstrating Heath's
involvement with the devices, and despite Zenkich's inconsistent
statements and lack of evidence, the court held that Zenkich was
the sole inventor of both the BI-PAK 2 and the BI-PAD.8 7 The
court appeared to place significance in Saulter's testimony that he
had not been privy to all conversations between Heath and
Zenkich.
The court held that Heath had the burden of proving he was
the inventor by a preponderance of the evidence.8 8 In doing so,
the court applied the burden of proof used in an interference
proceeding in which the first party to file their patent application
is the "senior party" and the second party to file their patent
82. It should again be noted that the patent application for the BI-PAK 2 was filed on
Feb. 28, 1978. The court did not seem to be troubled by the time passage between Zenkich's
alleged prototype and the filing date of the application. However, the court should have
realized that under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994), "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless...
(c) he has abandoned the invention .... Assuming that Zenkich did build a prototype of
the BI-PAK 2 in the early 1970s, there may be reasons justifying why the application was not
filed until 1978. However, one who delays filing a patent application because of dependence
on industry acceptance does so at his peril; such conduct is persuasive of suppression or
concealment. Woofter v. Carlson, 367 F.2d 436 (C.C.P.A. 1966), cert. denied sub. nom. AMP
v. General Motors, Inc., 389 U.S. 847 (1967). Moreover, one who reduces an invention to
practice, then delays for several years until another has invented and patented the same
device, is estopped by laches. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Butler Light, Heat & Motor Co., 205 F. 42 (D.Pa. 1913).
83. Heath, 540 N.E.2d at 779, 782.
84. Id. at 778.
85. Id. at 779.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 782.
88. Heath, 540 N.E.2d at 781.
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application is the "junior party." 9 However, Heath never filed a
patent application in his name directed to either invention. The
court seemed to be of the opinion that Heath had to prove that he
was the first inventor, and on this basis, the court believed that the
interference burden of proof is analogous. However, it does not
seem likely that both Heath and Zenkich independently conceived
the invention while working together without one copying from the
other. Substantially the entire opinion is directed to who conceived
the invention, not when each separately conceived the invention.9"
Perhaps the single most important piece of evidence in the
court's mind was that, during the preparation of the patent
applications, Heath did not specifically tell the patent attorney that
he was the inventor. The Heath court stated, "it is incredible that
he would simply assume he would be named an inventor on the
patent applications." 91 However, when a patent attorney prepares
a patent application, the patent attorney, of course, discusses the
invention with the inventor, as it is the inventor who is most
knowledgeable of the invention. Thus, the identity of the inven-
tor(s) is typically so apparent that the issue of inventorship seldom
arises in preparation of a patent application. Disputes having
inventorship as the sole patent matter cannot be heard in federal
court because they are considered property disputes. Heath was
therefore forced to bring his suit in a state court. The Heath state
court was apparently unfamiliar with the process of preparing a
patent application and foolish enough to place reliance on a
substantively irrelevant fact.
Another example of state courts not being properly equipped
to decide the patent cases they must now hear is Tate v. Scanlon.92
Tate was a trade secret case in which many patent issues arose.
89. The court asserted that the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof is used
"in a Federal patent action." Id. at 780. Perhaps the court did not realize that the burden
of proof it was applying is used in interference practice, and such cases are rather
infrequently patent suits.
90. The decision contains an illogical discussion as to whether Heath was hired to
invent, in which case the invention would automatically be assigned to Zenkich's company,
Zenex. The court stated, "Although it is undisputed that Heath was not hired by Zenex
specifically to invent or to provide design engineering services, neither was he hired by
Zenex to act as a service representative, sales person or advertising copyrighter." Id. The
court then went on to state that Heath was hired to invent if Zenkich had shown that he
knew how to produce the product. id. at 780-81. The court's rationale was less than clear.
91. Id. at 781.
92. 403 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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According to the facts of the case, nurse Karen Tate had an idea
for handling proline sutures. More specifically, Ms. Tate proposed
tip covers for clamps which could firmly grip the suture without
breaking it.93 The tip covers were radiopaque so that they could
be seen under x-ray.94 Ms. Tate further proposed a holder for the
tips which would enable easy accounting of the tip covers in an
operating room, and therefore, the tips would not be left in a
patient.95 Ms. Tate presented her ideas to Scanlon International,
Inc. who at first promised to compensate her for the idea, but later
reneged.96 Mr. Tate sued, and at trial, the jury ruled in her favor,
awarding her over $500,000.00.9' On appeal, a major issue was
whether Ms. Tate's ideas qualified as a protectable trade secret
property interest.98
For a trade secret to be protectable, it must not be generally
or commonly known in the trade.99 A patentable level of advance
is not required for something to be protectable as a trade se-
cret.1°° That is, a trade secret need not be patentable.1"1 Patent
law protects "inventions" whereas trade secret law protects
"discoveries."'1'° The state court in Tate analogized Ms. Tate's
case to patent cases. 3 While patent law is somewhat analogous
to trade secret law, the Tate court went on to assert erroneously
"the question of novelty often hinges on whether the subject of the
patent is obvious. ' ' 1°4 Courts have expressly held that whether
something is deserving of trade secret protection is not determined
by obviousness. For example, the Sixth Circuit in A. 0. Smith Corp.
v. Petroleum Iron Works Co."°5 stated "the mere fact that the
93. Id. at 669.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 669-70.
97. Tate, 403 N.W.2d at 668.
98. Id. at 671-72.
99. See CHISUM, supra note 30, § 1.06[l].
100. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Hargadine, 392 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1968); Dickerman Assoc. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., 594
F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1984).
101. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 853 (1989); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Elec. Concepts, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Va.
1970).
102. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934),
modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935).
103. Tate, 403 N.W.2d at 671.
104. Id.
105. 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934).
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
means by which a discovery is made are obvious.., cannot destroy
the value of the [trade secret]."'"
Moreover, novelty and obviousness are two separate concepts
not to be confused with one another. In the Tate opinion, the
court stated that the test for determining obviousness "is whether
the prior art discloses all elements of the claimed combinations, or
their mechanical equivalents, functioning in substantially the same
way, to produce the same result."'" Anyone familiar with patent
law would recognize that the test applied by the Tate court is the
test used to determine whether a patent is infringed under the
Doctrine of Equivalents.18 The correct test for determining
obviousness is whether "the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter
pertains."1"
After incorrectly stating that the obviousness standard should
be applied, and after incorrectly setting forth the obviousness
standard, the court in Tate looked at secondary considerations.
The court recognized that others have copied Ms. Tate's idea." °
However, the court looked at copying as indicating obviousness
rather than non-obviousness. The court did not appear to realize
that copying an idea demonstrates the merits of the idea and,
therefore, non-obviousness.
The court ultimately reached a correct conclusion and held
that Ms. Tate s idea was deserving of trade secret protection.'
However, the misstatements of law and confusion of intellectual
property law issues are compelling evidence that state courts are
unprepared to handle the cases involving patents which they must
now hear.
There are numerous other state court decisions in which state
judges made blatant errors which could have been avoided if the
decisions were decided by a federal court. For example, Waring v.
Dynamics Corp. of America"2 is a 1984 case in which Waring
licensed Dynamics Corporation of America ("Dynamics") to build
106. Id. at 538-39.
107. Tate, 403 N.W.2d at 671.
108. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
110. Tate, 403 N.W.2d at 671.
111. Id. at 674.
112. 475 N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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blenders which Waring had designed and patented. The court
stated that "since the late 1930's [Waring] has owned a patent for
a kitchen blender,""1 3 not recognizing that the patent had long
since expired. The license agreement was apparently for know-how
and trade secrets, although the opinion did not recognize this fact.
The court stated that the food processors Dynamics manufactures
were not covered under the blender agreement. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court seemed to look at Waring's expired patent.
However, it is readily apparent that no claim analysis was done."4
As another example of state court errors, in Carstedt v.
Grindeland,115 the Minnesota Court of Appeals seemed to reason
that there was no patent infringement because other people were
selling similar devices." 6 Furthermore, in Mannion Mechanical
Services, Inc. v. Stallings & Co., Inc.,17 Stallings was responsible
for acts described by the claims of the patent in question. 8
Although many of the acts occurred outside the United States, 9
the decision made no mention that a United States Patent only
conveys the exclusive right to practice the invention in the United
States." °
IV. The Federal Circuit Should Hold That All Patent License
and Assignment Disputes "Arise Under" Federal Patent
Law
As set forth above, state courts are currently forced to hear
patent cases which they are not equipped to handle. The inability
of state courts is shown by ignorance of important facts, mis-
interpretation of patent law and blatantly wrong decisions. The
patent cases currently heard by state courts are those which involve
license and assignment disputes in some manner.12' Therefore,
to ensure that patent cases are heard in more qualified federal
113. Id. at 421.
114. Id.
115. 406 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
116. Id.
117. 545 N.E.2d 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
121. Of course, the cases can also involve substantial patent infringement questions.
They are heard in state court under the well-pleaded complaint rule as long as the case was
originally pleaded as a license or assignment dispute.
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courts, the Federal Circuit122 should rule that license and assign-
ment issues "arise under" federal patent law. The Federal Circuit
should not hesitate in overruling previous patent jurisdiction cases,
such as Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 2 because the previous cases did
not conduct a sufficient inquiry into the differences between
general federal jurisdiction and patent jurisdiction. More specifical-
ly, the earlier cases dealing with the reach of federal patent
jurisdiction presented easy questions which did not require an
extensive inquiry.24 When federal courts were faced with more
difficult questions as to whether a patent issue was a federal matter,
the Mottley rule regarding general federal question jurisdiction was
already firmly established. Therefore, the federal courts easily
adapted the "arising under" rule of Mottley for patent cases.
A. A Federal Circuit Decision is the Appropriate Means for
Changing Patent Jurisdiction
For the Federal Circuit to change patent jurisdiction, it would,
in effect, have to overturn Supreme Court decisions, such as
Mottley. At first review, a federal court of appeals may not seem
to have the power to overturn Supreme Court decisions. Techni-
cally this is true but in reality the Supreme Court rarely reviews
Federal Circuit decisions. The Federal Circuit hears all patent
appeals from the federal district courts." Therefore, there are
122. In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the
Federal Courts Improvement Act. The Federal Circuit hears appeals that previously went
to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1295 and includes, among other things, final decisions of district courts
in patent actions based "in whole or in part" on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Thus, patent appeals,
previously taken to the regional courts of appeals, now go to the Federal Circuit.
Congress' main purpose in creating this new court of appeals was to promote
uniformity in patent law. H.R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1981). The Act
was also to reduce forum shopping and thereby decrease the costs of litigation and instill
predictability in the outcome of litigation. Congress believed this would in turn encourage
investment in the development of new products. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
19 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 19(a). As federal patent jurisdiction stands today,
with the well-pleaded complaint rule in effect, the legislative purpose of discouraging forum
shopping is certainly frustrated. As discussed earlier, see supra part II.C., a patent owner
who has licensed his patent to a licensee who is not paying royalties can either sue the
licensee on the license contract, a state cause of action, or sue for patent infringement, a
federal patent law cause of action. Thus, escaping the exclusive jurisdiction statute is quite
easy.
123. 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
124. See supra part II.C.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1993).
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no longer splits among the various federal courts of appeal, and the
Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for Federal Circuit deci-
sions.116  Thus, the Federal Circuit has great power to change
patent law. In fact, several commentators recognize the Federal
Circuit as the "final arbiter" for patent disputes.127  As a "final
arbiter," the Federal Circuit has been known to effectively overrule
Supreme Court decisions by carefully reasoning around the
decisions."2  Because the Federal Circuit routinely reviews the
patent jurisdiction statute, 29 a Federal Circuit decision is the
appropriate means for changing patent jurisdiction. 3 '
B. Patent Licenses and Assignments are Uniquely Federal Issues
In considering whether patent license and assignment issues
"arise under" federal patent laws, the Federal Circuit should realize
that patent licenses and assignments raise uniquely federal issues.
126. Only a handful of Federal Circuit cases have been reviewed by the Supreme Court.
See Brian S. Tomko, Comment, Scripps Or Atlantic: The Federal Circuit Squares Off Over
the Scope of Product-By-Process Patents, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (1995) (noting that
as of winter 1995, the Supreme Court has only heard four substantive patent law cases since
the creation of the Federal Circuit). On Jan. 8, 1996, the Supreme Court was scheduled to
hear Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 40 (1995).
127. Tomko, supra note 126 at 1694; Thomas Poche, Note, The Clinical Trial Exemption
From Patent Infringement: Judicial Interpretation of Section 271(e)(1), 74 B.U. L. REV. 903,
925 (1994); T. Rouse, The Preclusive Effect on ITC Patent Fact Findings on Federal District
Courts: A New Twist on In Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation, 27 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1417, 1462 (1994); E. Finkel, Means-Plus Function Claims in Light of Donaldson and
Other Recent Case Developments, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 267,287 (1994) ("[T]he
Federal Circuit is the final arbiter of patent issues. The Federal Circuit has not been shy
about reversing prior precedent, sitting en banc where necessary to achieve its objective.").
128. Richard H. Stem, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt-An Idea in
Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TEcH. 1, 6-7 (1994); Rouse, supra note 127, at 1462;
Sean T. Moorhead, Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal
Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421,
1436 (1992).
129. Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Rawplug Co. v.
Illinois Tool Works Inc., 11 F.3d 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993); McElmurry v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
130. Of course, patent jurisdiction could be changed by an act of Congress. However,
because of the numerous problems with the interpretation of the patent jurisdiction statute,
such as the failure of the Mottley Court to forsee that a state would be forced to decide the
validity of a patent, see supra part III.A, it seems more appropriate to simply change the
interpretation of the existing jurisdictional statute.
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1. According to Federal Law There is No Licensee
Estoppel.-One way that patent license and assignment disputes
present uniquely federal issues is that the common-law principle of
licensee estoppel does not apply in patent cases. According to the
1969 Supreme Court decision of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,131 federal
law permits a licensee to challenge the subject matter of the patent
license. However, according to state law, licensees were estopped
from such a challenge. In Lear, John Adkins was employed by
Lear to solve a problem in its design of gyroscopes ("gyro"). The
gyro Adkins designed was more accurate and less expensive than
the one Lear had been using and was immediately adopted by
Lear."' After filing his patent application, Adkins entered into a
license agreement with Lear in which Lear would pay Adkins a
royalty for every gyro that incorporated the Adkins design.133
Lear paid the royalties for two years and then stopped, claiming
that the patent was invalid as being anticipated by prior art.1
34
Adkins brought suit in California state court two years after Lear
stopped paying royalties. The California Supreme Court. affirmed
a judgment for Adkins3 5 and stated that the common-law rule of
licensee estoppel barred the licensee from claiming that the subject
matter of the license was invalid.1
36
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that a
patent licensee is not barred by licensee estoppel, and, therefore,
is able to challenge the validity of the licensor's patent. 137 The
Court reasoned that "[iicensees may often be the only individuals
with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continual-
ly be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need
or justification., 1
38
131. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
132. Id. at 655.
133. Id. at 659.
134. Id.
135. Adkins was awarded $880,000. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 435 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1967),
vacated, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
136. Id. at 331.
137. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
138. Id.
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The impact of Lear on the jurisdictional question of which
court should hear license/assignment cases cannot be understat-
ed 3 9 Prior to Lear there were many exceptions to the state rule
that a licensee could not challenge the validity of the patent as a
defense in a license case. Justice Harlan in his Lear decision noted
that "[t]he uncertain status of licensee estoppel in the case law is
a product of judicial efforts to accommodate the competing
demands of the [state] common law of contracts and the federal
law of patents.'4° The Lear decision ended the attempt to reach
a middle ground between a federal and state law conflict. The
Court ruled that the federal patent policy preempts the state law of
licensee estoppel.' 4 t
2. Federal Fiduciary Relationship in License/Assignment
Negotiations. -Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 42 decided in
federal court, established a uniquely federal fiduciary relationship
in patent license and assignment negotiations.1 43  According to
the facts of the case, Peter Roberts, a Sears and Roebuck sales
clerk, worked on developing an easier way to fasten and remove
bolts during his off duty hours.'" What the eighteen-year-old
eventually invented was a ratchet socket wrench with a quick
release feature. Roberts submitted the invention to Sears and
obtained patent protection. 45 Sears negotiated the purchase of
the rights to the Roberts patent knowing that the Roberts patent
had issued, that Sears planned to sell several hundred thousand
wrenches and that the wrench would be very successful. However,
Sears did not reveal this information to Roberts."4  While the
sales agreement Roberts entered into allowed him to receive a
maximum of only $10,000, Sears' profits on the now well-known
139. After the 1969 Lear decision, state courts could decide the validity of a patent since
Lear allows a licensee to challenge validity. See supra part III.A. State court determinations
of validity could not have been envisioned when the patent jurisdiction rules were set forth
in the 1926 Luckett v. Delpark decision.
140. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
141. The Court overruled Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339
U.S. 827 (1950), which had approved the licensee estoppel rule in the patent context. Lear,
395 U.S. at 671.
142. 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 978.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 979.
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socket wrench exceeded 40 million dollars.47 Roberts sued for
breach of a fiduciary relationship."4  Although Roberts was
represented by an attorney,'49 and Sears and Roberts were at
opposite ends of the bargaining table, the court implied a fiduciary
relationship between Sears and Roberts and awarded Roberts one
million dollars. 50 The court held that a fiduciary relationship
exists whenever the patent license agreement is unduly oppressive
or unfair to the patentee.'
The Sears case is cited by some to show that state common law
regarding fiduciary duties is applicable in the area of patent
licensing. 52 To hold this view, however, is to ignore the basic
principles that govern when a fiduciary relationship exists in the
employer/employee context. According to state law, courts only
imply a fiduciary relationship when the employee is a key employ-
ee, such as a corporate officer or director.'53 When the employer
and the employee are seen as one, a fiduciary duty will be implied
based on the duty of loyalty. The fiduciary duty implied in Sears
could not have been based on state law because Peter Roberts, a
sales clerk, was certainly not a key employee as defined and
required by the courts.
When state law does imply a fiduciary duty, it is a duty not to
compete." 4 Based on this duty, courts have held that an employ-
ee inventor has a duty to assign patents to the employer.'55
However, in Sears, Roberts had no duty to assign his invention.
The assignment was unquestionably based on a contract, not a
duty.
147. Sears, 573 F.2d at 984 n.7.
148. Id. at 980. The court repeatedly referred to the implied relationship as a
"confidential relationship." Id. However, the court's explanation indicates that the more
appropriate term would have been "fiduciary relationship."
149. During the negotiation process Roberts' attorney, Charles Fay, was contacted by
Sears about working for them, "thus raising some doubt about the independence of his
advice to plaintiff." Id. at 979 n.1.
150. Id. at 984.
151. Id. at 983. The court also held that Sears was estopped from asserting invalidity as
a defense in the action. Id. at 979.
152. See William P. Hovell, Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Right to His
Employee's Invention, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1983). If the Sears court was basing
its decision on state law, the court failed to mention which state's laws it was applying.
153. Most states prohibit, by statute, usurping a corporate opportunity. See HARRY
HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 236 (2d ed. 1970).
154. Hovell, supra note 152, at 870.
155. Id.
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The Sears case has also been cited as being based on state law
of fraud in the execution.5 6 However, fraud in the execution
occurs when one does not know what one is signing. Roberts knew
that he was signing a contract giving Sears rights in his patent. '57
According to state law, fiduciary duties are usually not implied
between people on opposite sides of the bargaining table, as were
Roberts, the licensor, and Sears, the licensee. Implying a fiduciary
relationship in this context would make bargaining impossible. For
example, the seller would have a duty to tell the buyer the
drawbacks of his purchasing decision. Thus, the Sears case clearly
represents a federal departure from state common law.
3. Federal Law of Patent Assignment Recordation.-In
addition to case law, there are federal statutory laws demonstrating
that license and assignment issues are uniquely federal issues. For
example, patent, trademark and copyright statutes have provisions
which require that all licenses and assignments be federally
recorded. The patent statute provides, "[a]n assignment, grant or
conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months
from its date." '158
Some cases heard in state courts turn on the federal law of
patent assignment recordation. For example, in Tollinger v. Ithaca
Gun Corp.,'59 Tollinger had an agreement with Ithaca Gun Co.,
("Ithaca") that if Ithaca stopped making Tollinger's patented
MAG-10 semiautomatic rifle for one year, the patent rights would
revert back to Tollinger.1 6 However, because this agreement was
not recorded in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, as required,
156. Id. at 877.
157. The facts of the Sears case do not rise to fraud in the inducement because there was
no showing that Roberts relied on representations made by Sears. Moreover, the court was
much more concerned with what Roberts was not told, than with the small amount of
misleading information he was given. Sears, 573 F.2d 976.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1993). Section 10 of the Lanham Act has a similar provision for
trademarks which states, "[a]ssignments shall be by instruments in writing duly executed ....
An assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within 3 months after
the date thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1993). The copyright laws have a similar provision, but
recordation is permissive, not mandatory. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1994).
159. 555 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
160. Id. at 909.
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it was not binding."' Thus, the decision turned on federal patent
law, but with federal patent jurisdiction as it currently stands, the
case was not heard in federal court.
162
Tollinger demonstrates how the patent recordation statute can
be used as a defense in litigation. Despite the federal issues raised
by this defense, the case can be heard only in state court. Al-
though it may be difficult to imagine the patent recordation statute
creating a cause of action, the statute shows a federal policy and
establishes that a patent assignment is different than most contracts
governed by state law. Therefore, federal court would be a better
forum for these disputes.
C. Ruling that a Patent License or Assignment "Arises Under"
Federal Law is Consistent With the Constitution
A ruling by the Federal Circuit that a patent license or
assignment "arises under" federal laws is supported not only by the
uniquely federal aspects of a patent license or assignment, but also
by the Constitution. The patent clause of the Constitution states
that "Congress shall have Power To . . . promote the Progress of
Science and the useful arts by securing ... to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."163 Based
on the word "exclusive," the Constitution mandates that inventors
shall have the "exclusive right" to their inventions, and all licenses
and assignments selling or giving away part of that right must be
governed by federal law."6 Moreover, the patent clause man-
dates that the patent system shall "promote the progress of the
useful arts."'65  Assuming that the incentive to invent, and,
therefore, the progress of the useful arts, are controlled by the
license and assignment contracts the inventor enters into, then,
according to the Constitution, license and assignment disputes raise
federal questions.
161. Id. at 910.
162. Tollinger was heard in a New York state court.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Neal Orkin argued that there is federal common law
based on the patent clause. See Neal Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor:
New Approaches to Old Problems (Part l-Conclusion), 56 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 719 (1974).
164. Another conclusion that follows from, and possibly weakens this argument, is that
inventors cannot assign or license their inventions because the Constitution gives the rights
exclusively to the inventors.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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For the Federal Circuit to rule that a patent license or
assignment dispute "arises under" federal patent laws, the Federal
Circuit would be required to interpret the words "arising under" in
the patent jurisdiction statute different than the words "arising
under" in the general federal jurisdiction statute. That is, the
patent jurisdiction statute would have to be interpreted closer to
the constitutional Osborn original ingredient test.t66 The Federal
Circuit should revise the statutory interpretation without hesitation.
The term "arising under" in the statutory context is not always
defined the same way it is defined in the general federal jurisdic-
tion statute. For example, in the landmark case United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs,167 the words "arising under" in the general
federal jurisdiction statute were interpreted in a manner similar to
the constitutional "original ingredient" definition."6  In Gibbs,
Texas Consolidated Coal Company ("Consolidated") laid off 100
mine workers. Gibbs was hired as the superintendent of a mine
and tried to open another mine for Consolidated.169 When Gibbs
was unable to open the mine, he sued the United Mine Workers
alleging that they threatened him, which violated a federal labor
statute. He also sued on the state cause of action of tortious
interference with business relations. These claims were brought
together in federal court.17 0 The only statutory basis for federal
jurisdiction over the state claim was the general federal jurisdiction
statute, § 1331, authorizing claims arising under the statutes of the
United States.171 In the spirit of judicial efficiency, the Supreme
Court held that the state law claims were within the federal courts'
constitutional and statutory purview."7 Specifically, the Court
held in order to have pendant jurisdiction, "[t]he state and federal
claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.
'173
166. This is because, to date, there is currently no federal statute providing a remedy for
license and assignment disputes.
167. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 718.
170. Id. at 720.
171. Pendant jurisdiction is specifically authorized by statute in two specific cases:
pendant jurisdiction of state unfair competition claims that are joined with federal copyright
or patent claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), and pendant jurisdiction in removal cases where
non-removable state claims are joined with removable federal claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c).
172. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729.
173. Id. at 725. Note that federal courts have discretion as to when pendant jurisdiction
should be exercised. See e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
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This test allows a much wider variety of cases in federal court than
the well-pleaded complaint rule. Federal courts have jurisdiction
over pendant state claims even though the state claim does not
arise under the laws of the United States in the traditional statutory
well-pleaded complaint Rule sense.174 The Court's willingness to
apply this broader test for federal jurisdiction in Gibbs indicates
that the Federal Circuit may expand federal jurisdiction to
encompass all patent cases.
V. Conclusion
Federal patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) as
currently applied is closely related to general federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction depends on the
remedy the plaintiff chooses to seek in his complaint. For example,
for a case to be heard in federal court, the case must be phrased as
a patent infringement case. Thus, through it's complaint, the
plaintiff is able to manipulate jurisdiction to suit its needs.
Moreover, some patent cases, such as those involving only patent
license or assignment issues, must be heard in state courts.
The issues which arise in a patent case are very complex, and
often state courts miss crucial facts, misinterpret the law and render
wrong decisions. Often, the state courts are simply incapable of
properly adjudicating the patent disputes they must now hear.
To correct this problem, the Federal Circuit should rule that
any cases involving a patent matter must be heard in federal court,
regardless of how the complaint is phrased and regardless of
whether the case only involves a patent license or assignment
(1984).
174. The discussion here is confined to pendant question jurisdiction which should not
be confused with pendant party jurisdiction. Pendant party jurisdiction is a doctrine allowing
parties into federal court whose entry would otherwise be prohibited. For example, if a
federal court had federal question jurisdiction over a first party for breaching a maritime
contract, it would not have jurisdiction over a non-diverse second party for a state tort claim
unless the two claims were closely related. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451
F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). The test to determine whether the two claims are closely related
is substantially the same as the Gibbs pendant claim test. See 3A JAMES W. MOORE & J.
LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 20.07[5.-1] (2d ed. 1989). A noteworthy pendant
party jurisdiction case is Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
indicated that for pendant jurisdiction, a court must look to the jurisdictional statute under
which the case was originally brought to determine whether it is appropriate to extend
jurisdiction to the Osborn constitutional limit. Id. Aldinger thus supports the theory that
it is appropriate to interpret a statute closer to the Constitution even though another statute
should not be so interpreted.
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dispute. A ruling of this type makes sense not only for the purpose
of improving patent decisions, but also because it is legally correct.
More specifically, a patent license or assignment is a uniquely
federal matter. Patent license and assignment cases should not be
excluded from federal court merely because no specific federal
statute authorizes their adjudication in the federal forum. For the
Federal Circuit to rule that all patent cases must be heard in
federal court, the Federal Circuit must reinterpret the words
"arising under" in the patent jurisdiction statute. Although the
words "arising under" in the patent jurisdiction statute have
historically been narrowly construed, like the language of the
general federal jurisdiction statute, no compelling reason exists for
continuing this narrow interpretation. In the statutory context, the
words "arising under" have been interpreted more closely to the
broader constitutional interpretation. The words "arising under"
in the patent jurisdiction statute should also enjoy this same broad
interpretation.
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